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Electric utilities have historically been granted monopoly franchises to take
advantage of the cost benefits of centralized production. In return for the
monopoly franchise, the utility gave the state the right to regulate price and
quality of service. In recent years, many have begun to question whe-ther cost
advantages of centralized production continue to exist in the electric utility
industry. Legislation has been proposed that would deregulate the industry and
allow greater competition.
This article argues that cost benefits of centralized production continue to
exist in the electric utility industry. Even if scale economies are exhausted in
electricity generation, as some argue, that fact alone would not mean the
absence of natural monopoly. The electric utility industry continues to be a
natural monopoly because of the benefits of economies of scope and vertical
integration. The authors conclude that although some problems may exist with
regulation in the electric utility industry, deregulation is not the answer. These
problems are better solved through various alternative reform proposals than
through radical restructuring of the industry.
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Introduction
For most of the twentieth century investor owned electric utilities (IOUs)
have been regulated by state regulatory commissions with the authority and
responsibility to balance consumer and stockholder interests. Typically IOUs
were granted monopoly franchises' within their service area because centralized
production of electricity was believed to yield lower unit cost. In return, the
monopolist gave to the state the right to restrict profit rates, regulate the price
of the service, and veto investment decisions of the firm. All of this would
occur in an environment of a prescribed level of service quality.
In the late 1970s the practice of monopolist IOUs was disrupted. As the
public began to perceive a worldwide "energy crisis," Congress and the Presi-
dent took a number of steps to respond to this problem. The Public Utility
Regulatory Policy Act of 1978 (PURPA) was one such Congressional re-
sponse.' PURPA marked the beginning of a radical change in the status quo
1. Utilities receive certification from a regulatory commission that the monopoly grant received is "for
the convenience and necessity of the public." In the parlance of regulation, they receive a "certificate of
convenience and necessity," also called a CCN.
2. 16 U.S.C. § 2602 (1988).
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for IOUs and electric utilities in general. Partially as a response to rapidly rising
input prices, PURPA attempted to encourage fuel conservation as well as more
efficient pricing by, in effect, relaxing restrictions on entry into the former
monopolist's service area.
There are at least two schools of thought that purport to justify easing entry
restrictions: (1) the cost advantages of centralized production technology have
been exhausted; and (2) typical rate of return regulation is inefficient. More-
over, implicit in these justifications is the notion that restructuring the industry
so that traditional regulation will no longer be necessary is less costly and more
politically palatable than merely altering the traditional form of regulation. For
example, in October of 1992 Congress passed the Comprehensive National
Energy Policy Act of 1992 (CNEPA) to restructure the industry by facilitating
entry.3 Title VII of this law amends the Public Utility Holding Company Act
(PUHCA)4 and creates a new class of electrical generators called Exempt
Wholesale Generators (EWG). The "exempt" status releases EWGs from certain
corporate prohibitions under PUHCA as administered by the Securities Ex-
change Commission. The law facilitates the establishment of independent power
generating stations by Independent Power Producers (IPPs) and electric utilities.
The new law further reforms PURPA's restriction on entry of electric utili-
ties into the non-utility generating sector of the market. PURPA originally es-
tablished a class of non-utility generators called "qualifying facilities" (QFs).
If a generating facility met certain technical definitions of thermal efficiency,
it could become a QF. A facility's primary product must be something other
than electricity in order to qualify for QF's non-utility status. The local electric
utility would be required to purchase excess power generated by the QF at rates
based on the utility's avoided cost5 as specified by the state regulatory commis-
sion. However, definitions of "public utility" under PUHCA restricted the entry,
of electric utilities into the non-utility generating sector of the market. Under
CNEPA, utilities can now own EWGs, and even purchase power from affiliated
EWGs. Perhaps more important given the new class of generators, title VII
gives the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) authority to require
a utility to transfer power from an independent generator to another utility.6
It is fairly certain, with the adoption of the new law, that the pressure to
compel transmission access and mandatory transfer of electric power between
utilities (mandatory wheeling) will become intense. Indeed, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) has not been idle on the issue of competition.
In a series of decisions concerning mergers and market based pricing, FERC
3. Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 (1992).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1988).
5. Avoided costs are the incremental costs not incurred by the utility as a result of purchasing the QF's
excess power.
6. This is referred to as "wheeling" power.
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has indicated its intention to compel competition in generation and to open
access to utility transmission lines.7
Ironically, all of these legislative and regulatory activities, combined with
the turmoil in the utilities industry, the resultant social transactions costs, and
uncertainty for investors and industrial planners come after a period when the
actual experience is rather different than the perception of energy crisis. The
real price of electricity between 1970 and 1982 increased only 52.5%, and has
decreased since 1982, so that in 1990, it stood only 25% above the 1970 figure.
In the same period, the real price of natural gas increased 238%, crude oil
122%, and coal 55%.8
In this article, we will consider if and when electric utilities should still be
considered natural monopolies. We will further address the nature of the
markets for electricity that are likely to evolve in the EWG environment, and
provide an outline of the reforms that might take place within traditional
regulation that provide reasonable alternatives to radical restructuring.
Part One provides an economic definition of natural monopoly in the single
product firm, discusses the nature of economic efficiency in this context, and
presents an overview of empirical research questioning the exhaustion of scale
economies. Part Two points out that electric utilities are multiproduct firms and
that the criteria for natural monopoly for multiproduct firms are quite different
than for single product firms. The case for the continued existence of natural
monopoly in this industry is even stronger in the multiproduct context. Part
Three discusses "weak" natural monopoly, a condition in which the cost
conditions required for natural monopoly remain, but in a context in which the
monopolist, absent assistance, cannot defend itself from market entry.
Part Four explores economies of vertical integration. We analyze why the
electric utilities vertically integrate initially and the benefits of this arrangement.
Part Five considers the costs and benefits that plausibly may derive in an
expanded EWG environment and the precise circumstances that must exist for
the touted benefits to arise. Finally, Part Six presents alternatives both to a
continuation of traditional regulation and to radical restructuring.
7. See, e.g., Public Service Company of New Mexico, 52 F.E.R.C. 9161,068 (1990); Nevada Sun-Peak
Limited Partnership, 54 F.E.R.C. $ 61,264 (1991); Utah Power & Light Co., 45 F.E.R.C. 9 61,095 (1988);
Northeast Utilities Service Company, 53 F.E.R.C. 1 63,020 (1991).
For summary observations on FERC guidelines see Bernard W. Tenenbaum and J. Stephen Henderson,
Market-Based Pricing of Wholesale Electric Services, ELECTRICrrY J., Dec. 1991, at 30.
8. 1990 DEPT. OF ENERGY ANN. ENERGY REV. 155, 179, 199, 225 (calculated from Table 100, Retail
Prices of Electricity Sold by Electric Utilities 1960-1990; Table 88, Coal Prices, 1949-1990; Table 80,
Natural Gas Prices by Sector 1967-1990; and Table 70, Crude Oil Refiner Acquisition Costs 1968-1990).
66
Vol. 10: 63, 1993
Electric Utility Competition
I. The Single Product Natural Monopoly
In this Part we provide a general economic definition for natural monopoly
and discuss the implications of that definition for the single product firm.
Furthermore, we clarify the efficiency conditions which are implied by such
a definition and present an overview of empirical work analyzing the extent of
natural monopoly for the single product firm in the electric utility industry.
A. Natural Monopoly Defined
A natural monopoly exists when a single firm can produce a desired level
of output at lower total cost than any output combination of more than one
firm. This is the condition that William Baumol called subadditivity.9
[Subadditivity] surely, is what anyone has in mind, at least
implicitly, when speaking of a monopoly's being "natural," and
that is what economists were undoubtedly groping for when
they (as it turns out, mistakenly) identified natural monopoly
with economies of scale.'
The issue of economies of scale arises because such a cost condition is a
sufficient but not necessary condition for natural monopoly in the single product
firm. A single product firm exhibits economies of scale if its longrun average
cost function is decreasing. While it is true that a production process which
exhibits economies of scale is subadditive at that output level, a production
process may also be subadditive even though it exhibits increasing average
cost. "
It is a stronger condition to require decreasing average cost than to require
only that costs be subadditive while allowing for increasing average cost. A
firm that exhibits decreasing average cost is called a strong natural monopoly.
A firm that exhibits increasing average costs but whose costs are subadditive
is a weak natural monopoly.
A weak natural monopolist may not be able to prevent another firm from
entering the monopolist's market and taking away a portion of the sales.
However, because costs are subadditive, society may prefer a single firm
producing that output rather than a multiplicity of firms producing the same
9. William J. Baumol, On the Proper Cost Tests for Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry,
67 AM. ECON. REv. 809 (1977).
10. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
170 (1982).
11. For a formal proof, see SANFORD V. BERG & JOHN TSCHIRHART, NATURAL MONOPOLY REGULATI-
ON: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 22-24 (1988).
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output. To fulfill this societal preference, the regulator must prevent entry into
the weak natural monopolist's market, and, of course, regulate price.
B. Efficiency Requirements in Strong Natural Monopoly
Economic theory insists that efficiency is achieved when prices equal
incremental cost. However, a strong natural monopolistic firm, whose incre-
mental cost is less than its average cost, is not viable when prices equal incre-
mental cost. It is necessary to allow the strong natural monopoly to recover at
least the average cost of the product. This may, however, cause additional
inefficiency, such as when the economically "incorrect" signal is sent to
consumers.
How can we achieve the greatest efficiency possible in the presence of an
overriding revenue constraint combined with economies of scale?
Baumol and Bradford seek to answer this question by analyzing the impli-
cations of the "Ramsey Rule" for allocative efficiency.' 2 The Ramsey Rule
maximizes well-being subject to a break-even constraint, 3 choosing the set
of prices which minimize distortions in output. The most efficient solution
possible is one in which those consumers who have the fewest alternatives, that
is, relatively low demand elasticity, receive the greatest mark-up over marginal
cost. Consumers who have the greatest number of viable alternatives, that is,
relatively high demand elasticities, receive the smallest mark-up over marginal
cost.
Determining what prices are efficient also may be affected by the growth
of firms which employ greatly differing technologies to provide services which
can be viewed as imperfect substitutes for one another." This condition is
referred to as intermodal competition. For example, allowing a gas-fired EWG
into the market of a coal or nuclear based utility might be considered intermo-
dal competition.
Ronald Braeutigam analyzes efficient pricing where there is intermodal
competition. Braeutigam uses the model in which railroads offering freight
transportation services are the strong natural monopolist and motor and water
carriers are competitive industries offering different modes of services that are
close substitutes for rail transport. With the alternative modes of service, the
demand elasticities for each customer class facing the regulated firm will be
12. William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM.
ECON. REV. 265 (1970).
13. Economy-wide well-being is given a mathematical specification to be maximized. But this
maximization problem is constrained by an additional specification that the utility firm's total revenues must
equal its total expenses. The constraint, given economies of scale, prevents the "first-best" result, i.e., price
= incremental cost. The Ramsey Rule is a "second best" result.
14. Ronald R. Braeutigam, Optimal Pricing with Intermodal Competition, 69 Am. ECON. REV. 38, 40
(1979).
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affected. From the perspective of the regulated firm, Ramsey prices are now
efficient only if firms providing the close substitutes adhere to them as well.
Otherwise the competitive nature within these firms in the other industries
drives price down to marginal cost, and the set of Ramsey prices charged by
the regulated firm is no longer desirable. 5
Braeutigam's result suggests that in order to insure allocative efficiency the
regulatory body must regulate all rival firms as well. The recent push for
competitive entry into utility generating markets may, therefore, require an even
greater expansion of regulation in order to obtain efficient outcomes.
C. An Overview of Empirical Investigations
Whether electricity generation is a natural monopoly has been questioned
because electricity generation may have exhausted scale economies. Economies
of scale are exhausted in the single product firm if production costs rise as fast
or faster than output. Since the range of cost subadditivity extends beyond the
point at which economies of scale are exhausted, the absence of scale econo-
mies does not necessarily indicate the viability of competitive firms. In examin-
ing the cost characteristics of electric utilities in the U.S., Christensen and
Greene, for example, have concluded that economies of scale in electric genera-
tion continue to exist up to about 4000 megawatts (MW) of capacity. 6 Focus-
ing on firm-level rather than plant-level economies of scale, 7 these economists
found there were 180 IOUs possessing their own generating capacity in the U.S.
Of these, approximately fifty-five percent had generating capacity of 2000 MW
or less, well within the estimated range of declining average costs. Only twenty
percent possessed over 6000 MW of capacity, the condition in which Christen-
sen and Green estimate average costs are constant to slightly rising.'
The patchwork quilt of regulation and the regional development of electric
utilities in the U.S. has created many firms that are too small to benefit from
economies of scale, and therefore, probably will fail. Thus, free entry would
be expected to decrease the number of utilities.
Atkinson and Halvorsen adjust for the possible existence of an over-capital-
ization bias'9 and conclude that scale economies continue to exist at the firm-
15. Id. at 38-48.
16. Laurits R. Christensen & William H. Greene, Economies of Scale in U.S. Electric Power Genera-
tion, 84 J. POL. EcON. 655 (1976).
17. Plant-level economies of scale involve those economies which are exclusively associated with the
operation of a single production plant. Firm-level economies involve the additional economies associated
with operating several plants under one management. Such additional economies include coordination and
scheduling, downtime maintenance, spinning reserve, for example.
18. Christensen & Greene, supra note 16.
19. According to the Averch-Johnson hypothesis, because utilities may earn income for stockholders
only on capital invested in plant and equipment, they may utilize an inefficiently large amount of capital
to produce a given amount of output. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under
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level up to 12,000 MW of capacity.2' Nelson and Wohar could find no evi-
dence that economies of scale diminished at all as average firm size in the U.S.
increased between 1950 and 1978.21
On plant level economies of scale for electricity generation, Joskow and
Schmalansee observe:
On average the industry's existing capital stock for generation... does
not appear to embody full exploitation of available plant-level economies
of scale .... In any case, over time, as old plants are replaced by efficient
new ones, we can expect a substantial increase in plant-level concentration
in bulk power markets. Competitive problems associated with deregulation
may thus worsen over time as the generation capital stock turns over.22
Joskow and Rose cite evidence that a doubling of capacity on subcritical
coal-fired units from 350 to 700 megawatts lowers unit per megawatt costs of
construction by 20%.23 In contrast, average plant availability declines from
about 76% to about 67.6%, representing an average availability decline of only
about 11%.'
In the primary coal technology, then, scale economies in construction are
not outstripped by availability problems on plants with capacity of up to 700
megawatts. Plants with even as little as 500 megawatts capacity are not small
plants. "Mom and Pop," ready-to-enter-any-market operations are far from
being able to benefit from the scale economies available for base load technolo-
gy. FERC's Office of Economic Policy Staff (OEP) report indicates that
average non-utility capacity was approximately forty-one megawatts.25
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1053, 1053-1069 (1962).
20. Scott E. Atkinson & Robert Halvorsen, Parametric Efficiency Tests: Economies of Scale and Input
Demand in U.S. Electric Power Generation, 25 INT'L ECON. REV. 647 (1984).
21. Randy A. Nelson & Mark E. Wohar, Regulation, Scale Economies, and Productivity in Steam
Electric Generation, 24 INT'L ECON. REV. 57 (1983).
22. PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALANSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC
UTILITY DEREGULATION 54 (1983).
23. Paul Joskow & N.L. Rose. The Effects of Technological Change, Experience, and Environmental
Regulation on the Construction Cost of Coal-Burning Generating Units, 16 RAND J. ECON. 1, 19 (1985).
24. Id. at 23.
25. OFFICE OF ENERGY POLICY, F.E.R.C., REGULATING INDEPENDENT POWER PRODUCERS: A POLICY
ANALYSIS 28 (1987) (unpublished staff paper). The 41 MW number was computed from figures cited in
the report as follows: 17313 MW/ 380 facilities = 45.6 MW per facility; 1761 MW / 40 facilities = 44 MW
per facility; and, 3390 MW / 126 facilities = 26.9 MW per facility. A weighted average of these various
(non-exclusive) observations is 41.1 MW per facility.
The point is simply that existing and proposed non-utility generating units do not even begin to achieve
a size which would permit the existence of scale economies.
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D. Conclusions Regarding the Single Product Natural Monopoly
In short, a large body of evidence indicates that the electric utility industry
has not exhausted economies of scale. Regulators cannot justify a policy to
encourage entry into the electric utility industry solely on the basis that econo-
mies of scale in generation have been exhausted.
Our conclusions from the arguments advanced in this Part may be sum-
marized as follows:
(1) Economies of scale is a sufficient but not necessary condition for
natural -monopoly in the single product firm;
(2) Intermodal competition with a strong natural monopolist may not
necessarily be efficient, and in any event may require an expansion of regu-
lation, not a contraction thereof;
(3) While empirical evidence is conflicting, there is a substantial body of
empirical literature indicating that economies of scale have not been exhausted
in any but the very largest electric utilities in the U.S.
H. The Multiproduct Natural Monopoly
In this Part we introduce the notion of the multiproduct firm and explore
the cost conditions under which multiproduct firms are natural monopolies.
Next we consider the vertical integration of electric utilities in the context of
their multiproduct nature. The integrated nature of electric utilities internalizes
various externalities. Finally, we consider how horizontal integration promotes
an efficient multiproduct service.
A. Natural Monopoly and Economies of Scope
The electric utility industry is likely to be a multiproduct natural monopoly.
In the previous Part we stated that the existence of economies of scale is a
sufficient but not necessary condition for natural monopoly in the single product
firm. Likewise, in a multiproduct industry, economies of scale are unnecessary
for the natural monopoly condition. Electric utilities supply a wide variety of
services including varying proportions of generation, transmission and distribut-
ion of various voltages, reliability and load stability. With multiple outputs,
economies of scale are neither necessary nor sufficient to create a natural
monopoly.26 A firm is a natural monopoly even if it experiences increasing
unit costs for each output in isolation, so long as it experiences decreasing total
costs when coordinating the production of all industry services. Economies of
scope exist if it is less costly to produce a given combination of outputs in a
26. WILLIAM SHARKEY, THE THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 66 (1982).
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single multi-product firm than to produce the same level of each of the distinct
outputs in respective specialty firms.
Preliminary research on economies of scope indicates that cost may decrease
from vertical integration. Frank Gollup and Stephen Karlson, as well as Alan
Finder, estimate multiproduct cost functions by separating output into whole-
sale, industrial, commercial and residential services.27 Both studies find strong
evidence of natural monopoly for even the largest of IOUs.
A multi-product firm becomes a natural monopoly when economies are
realized by joint production. It is "jointness" that distinguishes multi-product
from single-product natural monopoly. Examples of factors that may contribute
to economies of joint production are specialization and indivisibilities in inputs.
That is, there are economies of jointness in coordinating production activities
within a single firm. Berg and Tschirhart add that:
Here, we would expect that two (or more) outputs could share an
accounting, marketing, or other administrative department and incur less
cost than if each output utilized a separate department. Or, there may be
some externality that becomes internalized when two (or more) outputs are
brought into the same production process. Producing beef and cowhide is
one classic example of shared inputs, and daytime and nighttime uses of
electricity provide another example. 8
Electric utilities provide a variety of services. A power system maintains
equilibrium by balancing the amount of the power demanded and the amount
of the power generated. Failure to maintain this balance at any instant can
result in system failure. This necessity for continuous balancing requires vertical
coordination, which creates an externality. The externality stems from the fact
that decisions made at any stage dramatically can affect system viability and
reliability.
B. Vertical Integration and the Problem of Externality
An externality exists if a firm engages in an activity without incurring the
full cost or enjoying the full benefits of its consequences. The standardization
of equipment and materials, the coordination of production activities and the
pooling of facilities all create positive externalities. Institutional arrangements
that force a firm to bear the full costs imposed on other firms or that allow the
27. Frank M. Gollup & Stephen H. Karlson, Returns to Scale in Multiproduct Firms: An Application
to the Electric Power Industry (1980) (unpublished working paper, on file with Social Systems Research
Institute, University of Wisconsin-Madison); Alan E. Finder, Empirical Tests of Cost Subadditivity in the
Investor Owned Electric Utility Industry (1984) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Indiana University).
28. BERG & TSCHIRHART, supra note 10, at 42.
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firm to realize the full benefits it renders to other firms are said to internalize
the externality. With vertically integrated electric utilities, internalization is
ensured because the single firm bears all of the consequences of each activity.
Vertically deintegrating the generation, transmission and distribution functions
among a multiplicity of firms, while maintaining current levels of system
reliability and stability, increases the number of firms owning the components
of the system as well as the diversity of interests among these firms. In such
a case internalization is no longer guaranteed and the transactions costs associ-
ated with coordination via contractual agreements would increase.
Perhaps the most crucial potential externality the EWG environment will
create in the electric utility industry is loop flow. As between any two nodes
on a transmission grid, assuming they are the only two interconnected positions,
power flows smoothly so long as generation reductions at the receiving node
match the increases at the sending node and there is no, ceteris paribus,
changes in electricity demand. Two contracting parties will contract for an ex-
change in power at the rate required by demand conditions. In such a case, any
difficulties in transmission facilities can be negotiated between the contracting
parties. Potential externalities are internalized by the contract. However, such
a contract requires assumptions that are altogether too simple in today's com-
plex system of interconnections in which power is not exchanged between a
receiving node and a sending node that are uniquely connected. The electric
connection system in the U.S. is therefore accurately described as a grid system.
Contiguous utility systems are connected together in relationships, with few
exceptions, that involve greater than paired transactions. A transaction between
any two parties virtually always involves a third party or parties.
Unfortunately, as one professor of electrical engineering has observed,
electricity will follow the laws of physics, not the law of the land.29 Ohm's
Law indicates that electricity will move along, the path of least resistance
(impedance). Thus, power flows over transmission lines which are not part of
a transaction. This is an externality. The third party may be forced to rearrange
its interchanges of electricity or build additional transmission capacity in order
to protect itself from contractual flows of power to which it is not a party, nor
derives any benefit.
The problem of loop flow can be substantial. A FERC publication, Power
Pooling in the Western Region, makes the following observations:
Recent loop flows in the 300-600 MW range measured between the RMPP
[Rocky Mountain Power Pool] area and the Arizona-New Mexico systems
have been common. The increasing clockwise loop flows are now and will
29. William H. Kersting, Does the Physical Infrastructure Exist?, Remarks at the Conference of the
Center for Public Utilities at New Mexico State University: Deregulation of Electric Generation: Is It Time?
(September 1986).
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continue to adversely affect the transmission system in the southern part
of the RMPP area and the ability to export economy coal-fired energy to
replace southwest oil-fired energy. No practical solution to this problem
exists.... However, as the growth of RMPP Area coal-fired generation
increases to serve firm northwest loads, the clockwise loop flow problem
will continue to increase. Possible solutions include the opening of tie lines
and the installation of phase shifting transformers. However, none of these
solutions appears appropriate at present from an inter-connected standpo-
int. 30
Prevention of loop flow is possible from an engineering standpoint. But
preventive measures require the expenditure of millions of dollars on such
equipment as high voltage DC interties as well as additions to transmission
capacity. These investments are specific to the original transaction for which
they were intended and 'are therefore sunk costs. Aside from the fact that such
sunk costs constitute virtually impenetrable barriers to entry into a market, they
also represent additional substantial sums of money that must be added to the
cost of the changes the new law seeks to implement.
The fact that EWG contracts are voluntary does not mitigate the loop flow
problem. The RMPP grid is a voluntary system of interconnections. Recently,
a utility receiving power from Palo Verde Nuclear Generating System (PVNGS)
built a new transmission line with which to receive power from PVNGS. An
interconnected utility disputed the power flows asserting that it would have to
invest money in transmission protection because of loop flow. The interconnect-
ed utility's objection was ruled correct in arbitration. Yet, the original contract
was voluntary. The proposed EWG environment will not simplify this problem.
Incremental modifications in legislation clearly will lead to mandatory
transmission access. As more players enter the market, the demand for addition-
al legislation to give EWGs even greater access to the utilities transmission grid
is likely to become irresistible. Moreover, one might speculate that in an
expanded EWG environment an extension of the anti-monopoly leveraging
doctrine announced in the Otter Tail Power case31 could lead to courts order-
ing mandatory wheeling without waiting for new legislation or FERC's case
by case approach to reach the same conclusion.
Vertical coordination between generation, transmission and distribution may
also create cost savings at the planning stage, through the timing of needed
30. WESTERN REGIONAL TASK FORCE, F.E.R.C., POWER POOLING IN THE WESTERN REGION 89 (1981).
31. Otter Tail Power v. U.S., 410 U.S. 366 (1973). Otter Tail Power Company was a Minnesota gener-
ating and transmission utility serving a variety of distribution utilities. When a town sought to end its pur-
chase contract and requested Otter Tail to wheel power purchased from another utility, Otter Tail refused.
Otter Tail was convicted of a Sherman Act §2 violation. The Court found that Otter Tail was attempting
to "leverage" legitimate monopoly power over the transmission facilities into a market over which it had
no legitimate monopoly, power generation.
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investments and during operation, by the scheduling of maintenance and the
use of energy interchange to meet a given demand with less capacity connected
to the load.
C. Economies in Horizontal Integration
Horizontal integration may create lower costs by increasing load diversity
and lowering the total required amount of reserve capacity (where different
utilities may peak at different times of the year or day). Power pools provide
this type of coordination. Generally the biggest single benefit of pooling is the
reductions in reserve generating capacity, but economic dispatch has proven
to generate large savings as well. As Gegax and Tschirhart point out:
Utilities maintain generating capacity in operating reserve status to meet
unexpected increases in demand, equipment failures, and maintenance. The
level of reserves needed depends primarily on the size of on-line generating
units and the loss-of-load probability the utility wants to achieve. An
isolated utility may determine that a particular level of reserves is needed
to meet the risk of excess demand; but this level can be reduced through
coordination, since the risks confronted by two or more coordinated utilities
are less than the sum of risks confronted by the utilities in isolation.32
Gegax and Tschirhart also point out that many large utilities in the U.S. are
able to avoid power pooling because they can achieve economies of horizontal
integration without incurring contracting and coordination costs with neigh-
boring utilities.
D. Conclusions Regarding the Multiproduct Natural Monopoly
The arguments above allow us to arrive at the following conclusions
regarding multiproduct natural monopoly:
(1) The multiproduct nature of integrated electric utilities yields economies
of scope. Economies of jointness in electric utilities are likely to be sufficient
to yield natural monopoly status;
(2) The multiproduct nature of the electric utility industry obviates the need
to make reference to economies of scale, irrespective of whether they have been
exhausted;
32. Douglas Gegax & John Tschirhart, An Analysis of Interfirm Cooperation: Theory and Evidence
form Electric Power Pools, 50 S. EcoN. J. 1077, 1079.
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. (3) Vertical integration in the electric utility industry contributes to the
industry's ability to simultaneously produce an efficient level of output and to
internalize the problem of loop flow;
(4) Horizontal integration in the electric utility firms enables industry to
reduce the total cost of output-cum-reliability by allowing firms to reduce
reserve capacity per unit of output.
III. Unsustainable Monopoly Markets
In this Part we further develop the concept of weak natural monopoly with
emphasis on the facts that (a) a "weak" natural monopoly is still a natural
monopoly, and asset duplication is inefficient for society, (b) a "weak" natural
monopoly is consistent with observed entry, and (c) maintenance of such a
monopoly requires absolute entry deterrence.
A. The Nature of an Unsustainable Market
A weak natural monopoly with constant or increasing'long-run average costs
is likely to be able to produce additional output under conditions of economic
subadditivity. Pricing at marginal cost will yield economic profits that invite
either entry by a similar firm or intermodal competition. Allowing such entry,
however, would be uneconomical and a waste of society's resources.
Ed Zajac explains one circumstance of vulnerability which is possible for
the efficiently pricing monopolist.3  In such a condition of vulnerability, Zajac
proves that no matter how a firm apportions the required revenue among
customer classes, some classes will contribute in excess of their respective
stand-alone cost. These classes have an incentive to purchase service from a
rival firm. Ramsey prices would be unsustainable. Such a firm must have its
market protected in order to benefit from cost subadditivity, even when the firm
is charging theoretically efficient prices. The existence of entry into an industry
simply does not mean that the entry is efficient.
B. Unsustainability and Power Markets
Allowing entry into monopoly markets drives up the overall average cost
of generating and selling electricity. A utility provides not only current to a
line, but also current.which has some high probability of being there when it
is needed. A utility builds generating plant and transmission plant to achieve
some required level of reliability. There are two products: power and reliability.
33. EDWARD E. ZAJAC, FAIRNESS OR EFFICIENCY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING
78-80 (1978).
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Utilities maintain generating capacity in operating reserve status to meet
unexpected increases in demand, equipment failures, and maintenance. The level
of reserves needed depends primarily on the size of on-line generating units
and the loss-of-load probability the utility desires to achieve. The level of
reserve capacity needed to meet excess demand or equipment failure with high
levels of reliability is not trivial. Typical levels of reserve capacity range
between 15 and 30 percent of on-line generating capacity.
A firm may generate some level of power, equivalent to what the utility is
selling to any customer, at a lower apparent cost than that incurred by the
utility. However, such a firm is entering only the market for power, without
providing for reliability. The utility could be required to provide reliability not
only for the power it produces itself, but also for power the new entrant
produces. The irony is that, in such an event, the utility's costs per unit of
power provided is likely to increase, due to the additional facilities required to
be built to provide reliability for the entrant's production. Additionally, the
utility absorbs the financial risk associated with the EWG and consequently will
be penalized in securities markets. In such a case, the utility would ask for an
increase in its allowed rate of return and in prices.
In contrast, if the utility had acquired the additional facilities internally,
although additional reserve capacity would be necessary as well, coordination
in facilities planning would reduce the overall cost of the bundle.
CNEPA, by creating EWGs exacerbates the problems faced by the utility in
maintaining reliability to the extreme. For example, the Texas Industrial Energy
Consumers have recently persuaded the Texas Public Utilities Commission to
consider requiring utilities to wheel power to retail customers.34
The additional problem is that after the new entry, the utility's costs look
even worse, thus inducing even more entry. Such a situation can be handled
easily by requiring the entrant to bear the cost of a given level of reliability for
the power it generates. Indeed, FERC has recently allowed utilities to seek com-
plete cost recovery for upgrading facilities necessary for wheeling from the re-
quester.35 In fact, if the costs of providing for reliability had been evaluated
previously when considering the so-called efficiency of the QFs and PURPA
machines,36 the EWG would not receive the existing level of enthusiasm.
34. Fortunately, this practice is prohibited under the existing PUHCA reform provisions of Title VII
of the Comprehensive National Energy Policy Act.
35. See, e.g., Entergy Services, 58 F.E.R.C. 61,234. But see Northeast Utilities Service Company,
53 F.E.R.C. 65,020, in which obtaining such cost reimbursement will probably require a formal hearing
to establish whether or not the entrant is indeed responsible for reliability costs.
36. A "PURPA machine" is a QF which would not exist except by virtue of the requirement that a
utility purchase the power it creates. Such QFs are totally in contravention of the idealistic and optimistic
purposes of the Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act of 1978.
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C. Conclusions Regarding Unsustainable Monopoly Markets
A firm may possess a considerable range of future output expansion while
remaining in a range of cost subadditivity despite having exhausted scale
economies. Society benefits by maintaining the firm's monopoly. These monop-
olies cannot prevent uneconomic entry into the market, however, without
protection by society.
IV. Transactions Costs and the Vertically Integrated Firm
Vertical integration eliminates or conserves transactions costs. Almost every
activity engaged in by vertically integrated utilities today, however, is also
performed by ,vertically deintegrated firms. Why, then, is vertical integration
necessary?
Oliver Williamson says "[t]ransaction costs are the economic equivalent of
friction in physical systems. '37 Transaction costs include problems such as
market uncertainty, the quantity of trading partners, and human factors such
as bounded rationality and opportunistic behavior. Market uncertainty refers
to the fact that events in the future such as future demand, costs of inputs,
prices of outputs and institutional arrangements are not known Within any
reasonable probability. As a result, as William Sharkey points out, long-term
contracts may be essential to economize on costs. 38 Vertical integration is
beneficial because it avoids such contracting costs. Indeed, in the utility indus-
try today, the absence of vertical integration is compensated by long-term
contracts which likewise seek to conserve on short-term transactions costs.
However, long-term contracts are typically underpinned by a long historical
relationship between contracting parties.39
The quantity of trading partners affects transaction costs because the more
firms with which any given firm must deal, the greater the number of contracts
which must be negotiated. On the other hand, reducing the number of contract-
ing pairs does not improve efficiency necessarily because smaller numbers of
participants may result in opportunistic behavior and the use of market power.
Bounded rationality is the notion that although economic actors intend to
be rational, they intend to be so in only a limited sense. Limitation stems from
limited competence or an economizing of mental effort. In either case, some
economic actors will have superior performance than others in any given
situation. Blair and Kaserman point out the importance of bounded rationality
37. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPIrrALISM 19 (1985).
38. SHARKEY, supra note 24, at 81.
39. These historical relationships give rise to what is referred to in the literature as "idiosyncratic infor-
mation." In other words, human capital specific assets are a form of sunk cost that constitute a barrier to
entry.
78
Vol. 10: 63, 1993
Electric Utility Competition
for vertical integration: "Because of these limits, 'uncertainty' may exist at the
individual level even when all relevant data are theoretically available, that is,
when no market uncertainty is present."' Bounded rationality involves a
transaction cost, then, at the moment of negotiating a contract.
When opportunistic behavior is likely, transaction costs increase.On oppor-
tunism Williamson said, "More generally, opportunism refers to the incomplete
or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculate efforts to mislead,
distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse. It is responsible for real or
contrived conditions of information asymmetry, which vastly complicates prob-
lems of economic organization."4
Firms concerned with opportunistic behavior on the part of others must
take costly precautions. Precautions include negotiating detailed contracts in
order to avoid exploitation by the opportunistic behavior of others. Blair and
Kaserman summarize the effects from the variety of transaction costs:
".... (1) long term contracting costs are increased by the combined effects of
market uncertainty and bounded rationality, while (2) the costs of relying upon
an equivalent series of short-term contracts are increased by the combined
effects of small numbers bargaining and opportunism."42
Vertical integration within a single firm avoids the transaction costs associ-
ated with both long-term and short-term contracts.
V. The EWG Environment and Transactions Costs
In this Part we postulate the kind of market that must develop in the EWG
environment in order to reap the benefit of efficiency through competition. We
consider the recent theoretical discussions of "contestable" markets and compe-
tition for, rather than in, markets. Absent large numbers of buyers and sellers,
we find these substitutes wanting. Rather, experience from other industries
suggest that sufficient competition is unlikely to develop.
A. The Requirements of a Competitive Market
We evaluate the EWG environment by looking to the potential benefits and
costs. The potential benefits are the increased incentives for cost minimization
at the individual firm level and the closer tracking of price and marginal cost
at the consumer level. Potential costs are the scale economies, economies of
scope, economies of integration and intra- and inter-firm cooperation not
realized under deintegration.
40. ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION
AND CONTROL 20 (1983).
41. WILLIAMSON, supra note 35, at 47-48.
42. BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 38, at 20.
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The putative benefits of an EWG environment depend upon the degree to
which competition prevails. Deregulation does not necessarily imply competi-
tion. For example, there are fewer commercial airlines today than in 1978 when
the airlines were deregulated. The number of such commercial airlines is likely
to continue to decrease. Allegations of price-fixing brought by the Department
of Justice Antitrust Division against the airline industry have been settled by
a consent decree in which the airlines involved agree to reimburse a portion
of the ticket price to those who traveled during the period of the alleged
conspiracy.43
Mergers have likewise reduced the number of pipeline firms since FERC's
experiment with compelling common carriage on the gas pipeline industry."
In addition, over $9 billion in existing take-or-pay contracts with producers
became the obligation of pipelines, much of which had to be absorbed by
stockholders. 5 The process of renegotiating these contracts and dispute resolu-
tion was not without costs.46
Active competition creates efficiency. In a world of scarce resources
conscious rivalry will arise among vendors. However conscious rivalry should
not be confused with an economists notion of competition. As Clarkson and
Miller point out, "jockeying for position in the car market among the Big Three
is an example of vigorous rivalry, but the market structure is not one of perfect
competition. On the other hand, perfect competition between producers may
exist without conscious rivalry. Two Nebraska wheat farmers on adjacent farms
are perfect competitors, but certainly are not conscious rivals. '47 Indeed, the
bidding for power capacity contracts may involve intense rivalry with or
without the structure of competition.
Efficiency gained through competition requires the existence of a large
number of actual competitors. Actual competitors are firms that will take
serious portions of the market share should there be any slack in competitive
performance. To ensure the existence of actual competitors, there must be
negligible barriers to entry so that potential competitors can freely enter the
market. Conversely, there must be relatively small barriers to exit so that firms
can leave at the first sign of trouble. Small barriers to entry and exit allow the
market to efficiently allocate resources among alternative competitive uses.
However, the ease to entry and exit requires an absence of sunk costs, bounded
rationality, opportunism and externalities.48 None of these four factors exist
in the electric utility industry.
43. A consent decree does not imply wrong doing, but a settlement is cause for concern.
44. Curtis Cramer, Natural Gas Pipelines and Monopoly, in PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION: THE
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 137, 152 (Kenneth Nowotny et al. eds., 1989).
45. DEPT. OF ENERGY, NAT. GAS MONTHLY (Jan. 1991).
46. Id.
47. KENNETH W. CLARKSON & ROGER LEROY MILLER, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 109 (1982).
48. WILLIAMSON, supra note 37.
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In a competitive market, price equals marginal cost. An individual firm
operating within a competitive market is a price taker in that it takes the market
price as given. With a sufficient number of firms, each firm has a negligible
influence over market price via its production decision. If a firm has influence
over market price, then price may diverge from marginal cost. A firm capable
of sustaining a price greater than marginal cost has market power. A price
greater than marginal cost causes allocative inefficiency because too few
resources are allocated to the industry. Output is too low relative to the value
consumers place on the good and to the cost of expanding service.
B. Contestable Markets and Demsetz Competition
In some situations the existence of a large number of actual competitors
may be unnecessary to insure that price equals marginal cost. A market is
contestable when the mere threat of entry is sufficient to keep price close to
marginal cost.49 Shepherd comments on the notion of contestability and replac-
es the term "contestability" with the term "ultra-free entry." The term ultra-free
entry is appropriate because the only condition in which the threat of entry
keeps price close to marginal cost is when entry is free and without limit, entry
is absolute, entry is perfectly reversible, and sunk cost is zero.5 0
In a contestable market, entry and exit conditions are such that a firm may
enter the market, take the whole bundle, and leave at the first sign of trouble
without incurring entry and exit transactions costs. The ultra-free entry condi-
tion creates credible threat sufficient so that all existing firms behave in an opti-
mal fashion. Commenting on the zero sunk cost assumption for contestability,
Baumol states that: "If the share of relatively untransferable capital is 'large,'
the activity belongs to the domain transactions cost analysis. If it is 'small,' it
falls within the territory of contestability. ' 51
, The electric utility industry does not have ultra-free entry because utilities
firms require substantial sunk cost. Moreover, raising the specter of contracting
as opposed to overt entry does not save the theory. If an entrant can offer long-
term contracts to cover a given market share, how much more easily can an
existing firm do so?52 While it is true that many kinds of corporations use
the sale-leaseback technique to finance their bulk-power business, it is just as
true that in the absence of the "leaseback," the "sale" would not have been
consummated. Bankers and insurance companies do not acquire large baseload
generating stations for which there is not a long-term guaranteed market. In any
49. BAUMOL ET AL., supra note 9, at 6.
50. William G. Shepherd, Contestability and Competition, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 572, 573 (1984).
51. William Baumol, Williamsons "The Economic institutions of Capitalism", 17 RAND J. ECON. 279,
284 (1986).
52. Shepherd, supra note 48, at 576.
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event, long-term contracts such as the "leaseback" violates the "contestability"
conditions.
Shepherd observed:
The case of a monopoly or dominant firm facing ultra-free entry is
probably unstable and transient, not an equilibrium state. If costs provide
for a natural monopoly, the resulting firm will create entry barriers, threaten
retaliation, and generally violate the assumptions of ultra-free entry... The
case of an entry-nullified monopoly or dominant firm is unlikely to last
even when it does occur.53
Thus "contestability" or "ultra-free entry" does not completely substitute
for the existence of competitors which ensure the many benefits of competitive
markets.
For example, some utilities are either compelled to or voluntarily put
incremental generation requirements out for bid at rates equal to the utilities'
avoided cost. An EWG would not accept the contract if it has an incremental
cost higher than the utility's avoided cost. The result of the utilities' compelled
or voluntary bidding is a long-term contract which fully compensates the EWG
at the EWGs total embedded cost.54 Such a contract would stipulate, at a
minimum, "take-and-pay" provisions for the EWG facilities output at rates fully
compensating all fixed costs and expected operating costs with escalation.
Such contracts are not only anti-competitive, but also place all of the EWGs
risk on the host utility. If the EWG defaults or fails to complete the project,
the host utility has the responsibility to supply the levels of power contracted
by the EWG. If projected future demand does not materialize, the utility likely
will be required to reduce its own production of energy in order to utilize the
cost-plus energy of the EWG. These shifts of risk onto the host utility harm
the utility's bond ratings.
53. Id. at 578.
54. See, e.g., Re Biennial Resource Plan Update Following the California Energy Commissions Seventh
Electricity Report, Dec. No. 91-06-022, 1.89-07-004, Cal. Pub. Util. Comm., June 5, 1991, reprinted in 124
PUR 4th 181, 204. The California Commissions order observes:
"We are persuaded that the IDR[idenitified deferred resource]
should remain the benchmark for QF bidding but that avoided
cost principles do not require QFs to match the [DR payment
structure. Both capital intensive QFs and cogenerators
should benefit from bidding a payment structure that cor-
responds to the cost structure of the plant to be financed.
this translates to lower risks to QFs and ultimately to
ratepayers."
If this does not mean that the QFs are to be fully compensated, with risk shifted to the utility, it is difficult
to know what it means.
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Some analysts assert, however, that the bidding process itself is a substitute
for competition in the market. Bidding represents competition for the market,
known as the Demsetz competition. The winning bids reflect the most efficient-
ly built generating plants. However, our analysis indicates that there is unlikely
to be "numerous" competitive agents at the bidding stage. Because of scale
economies, electricity generation is a tight oligopoly. Moreover, to prevent the
exercise of market power ex post, parties to the contract will specify ex ante
price and price-escalation clauses, as well as minimum sales and performance
standards. These precautions require the parties to know a good deal about the
future. The uncertainty and chance for opportunism involved when formulating
these precautions are what Williamson believed would lead to market failure.
One alternative to providing for an uncertain future would be to negotiate
a series of short-term contracts. However, not only are such short-term contracts
unlikely to be viable, they produce potential anti-competitive outcomes. Once
the contract period is over and a new bidding process begins, the EWG which
won the first bid has substantial advantages over potential bidders in the second
round. The prior winner has the sunk cost in place as well as the experience
with the purchasing utility. In addition, the original EWG has gained crucial
managerial expertise that is specific to the purchasing utility. These inter-firm
relationships are what Williamson refers to as human capital specific assets.
Human capital specific assets are effective as barriers to other firms entering
the bidding process. Competition is already severely thwarted at the beginning
of the second round.
The potential for market failure due to transactions cost and residual cost-
subadditivity indicates that the number of firms in the electric utilities market
will continue to decrease. The relatively small generating firms will consolidate
into fewer, but much larger generating firms. All things considered, the EWG
environment is most likely to be a tight oligopoly. The benefits of competition
will not be possible in the EWG environment regardless of how the legislation
defines an EWG or FERC defines market power. Nonetheless, the EWG
environment will increase the cost of delivering electricity at socially deter-
mined levels of reliability.
C. Conclusions Regarding the EWG Market Environment
Deregulation or deintegration do not necessarily yield competition with the
accompanying gains in efficiency. Nor will reliance on the electric utility
market being "contestable" suffice. The enormous sunk costs and the plethora
of long-term contracts disqualify utilities markets from being "contestable."
The Demsetz competition for markets, as opposed to competition within
markets, is also bound to fail in the long-run. Rather, the deintegrated EWG
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markets will evolve into tight oligopolies, stealing from society both the
benefits of regulated monopoly and of competition.
VI. Alternatives to Competitive Entry
The pressure to allow competitive entry into the electric utility industry
originates from two points of view. According to one, the cost advantages of
centralized production have been exhausted. The other point of view holds that
traditional regulation provides perverse incentives to the regulated firm. A large
body of literature suggests that regulated firms do not minimize cost, and
therefore society does not derive the benefits of natural monopoly. This article
does not address the latter of these arguments. Rather, this article seeks to point
out that alternatives to radical restructuring have been ignored or wrongly
brushed aside for lack of merit or for being too expensive. For example,
incentive regulation schemes can achieve many of the goals of de-regulation
without the attendant costs of radical restructuring. Competitive bidding moni-
tored by regulatory and antitrust authorities is also superior to deregulation.
Moreover, rate base, rate-of-return regulation could be rescued from creating
perverse incentives by decoupling. Decoupling requires separating the process
of setting rates and establishing investment priorities from the process of deter-
mining revenue requirements. Decoupling has proven to be useful in implement-
ing strategies of Demand Side Management (DSM), where at least one outcome
may be that electric utilities purposefully sell less electricity to consumers
generally.
DSM eases the need to build either baseload or peak load generation plants
because DSM investments offer an inexpensive and environmentally benign
alternative to generation. DSM offers a saving to both consumers and the
utility. However, because some fixed costs are recovered in the price of variable
consumption, a reduction in consumption may impair the utility's ability to
recover the allowed rate of return. Thus there is a need to "decouple" revenues
from sales. The California PUC with Pacific Gas and Electric and Southern
California Edison, for example, apparently have successfully used decoupling
in implementing DSM strategies. The political costs have evidently been
minimal. 5
Incentive regulation, usually associated with price caps, is another form of
"decoupling." In effect, regulators and the utility together establish prices for
service, usually some rate at which prices may escalate, for example, the
Consumer Price Index minus a productivity adjustment of 1% or 2%. Any rate
change within those bounds may be implemented automatically. If the utility
55. See DSM Steering Comm. of Elec. Util. Managers of Tex.. A Survey of Demand-Side-Management
Cost Recovery Systems (Ron Hiltunen, ed., 1991).
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is able to lower costs, the utility may keep the resulting extra profits. The
incentive to increased efficiency is apparent. 6 Incentive regulation appears
to be working for telecommunications firms in many states.
Optional tariff schemes, another form of innovative regulation, give rate
payers a menu of rate designs that closely track marginal rates with incremental
cost. For example, the capped rate could be a status quo average cost rate. As
an alternative to the average cost rate, consumers may opt for a tariff which
includes a higher demand charge but a variable rate closer to incremental cost.
Those who continue with the status quo rate are no worse off, while those who
choose the optional tariff, typically high volume users, are presumably better
off. Any incremental consumption charged at the lower variable rate yields an
incremental profit that rate payers and stockholders can share.57 Flexible
pricing schemes such as optional tariff schemes allow consumers and utilities
to benefit without regulatory cost. Regulatory supervision is needed only when
there is a change in the capped status quo rate, in which case a standard rate
needs to be re-formulated.
Vogelsang and Finsinger proposed a multiproduct pricing scheme in which
the regulator allows the utility to charge any price for the next period, so long
as the hypothetical revenue from the proposed prices in the next period, and
current quantities, are less than current revenues. Under certain situations this
process yields Ramsey prices without requiring the regulator to collect an
inordinate amount of information. The regulator need know only the current
quantities and revenue.
58
When utilities offer new generation needs for bidding, competitive bidding
has been proceeding without the need for PUHCA reform or much FERC
action. Under the aegis of the Texas PUC, members of Electric Reliability
Council of Texas (ERCOT) have added significant IPP and QF generation over
the last decade. 59 Southwestern Public Service was acquiring co-generator ele-
ctricity well before the passage of PURPA, but in the pre-PURPA environment
the fuel savings were real, rather than legislatively induced.
The Western Systems Power Pool (WSPP) implemented an experiment in
flexible pricing for coordination and transmission services in 1987. The WSPP
used an electronic bulletin board through which participants could buy and sell
energy within pre-established pricing boundaries. Between 1987 and 1991 the
56. For a discussion, review, and evaluation with respect to electrics, see Paul R. Joskow & Richard
Schmalansee, Incentive Regulation for Electric Utilities, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1986).
57. Robert D. Willig, Pareto-Superior Nonlinear Outlay Schedules, 9 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI.
56, 64 (1976).
58. Ingo Vogelsang & JOrg Finsinger, A Regulatory Adjustment Process for Optimal Pricing by Multi-
product Monopoly Firms, 10 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SC. 157 (1979).
59. Jay Zarnikau et al., Wheeling Nonutility Power: The Texas Experience, ELECTRIcrTY J., Aug.-Sept.
1989, at 32.
The Yale Journal on Regulation
experiment saved the participants and consumers $71 million. 61 However, the
experiment was terminated because the pool did not meet FERC's exacting
standards with respect to open access. All gains from such trading were lost
because of FERC's radical reforms.
In short, there are alternatives to a radical restructuring of the electric utility
industry and the imposition of unwarranted entry into what remains an essen-
tially cost subadditive setting. The alternatives are likely to cost less and allow
for more evolutionary experimentation than FERC and the Comprehensive
National Energy Security Act's current approach would permit.
Conclusion
The surge in electricity price, escalation in nuclear plant investment, utility
bankruptcies and other failures in the electric utility industry in the late 1970s
and early 1980s led some analysts to question the existing institution of regula-
tion. These analysts have increasingly suggested relying on a competitive
market. Furthering this agenda, FERC mandates open access to utility transmis-
sion facilities for the wheeling of bulk power and Congress has expanded the
number of firms that can benefit from FERC's open access policy by creating
a new entity, the EWG.
Some analysts justify Congress and FERC's competitive market approach
by pointing out that the economies of scale that historically justified the exis-
tence of monopoly in electric utility generation has been exhausted. This article
shows that economies of scale is only a sufficient condition for natural monopo-
ly, and not a necessary condition. For the single prod uct firm, natural monopoly
cost conditions may exist despite the lack of economies of scale. If a firm has
subadditivity, the firm has natural monopoly cost conditions, and society must
restrict entry to preserve the benefits of natural monopoly.
Electric utilities are, in reality, multiproduct firms. For multiproduct firms,
economies of scale are not a necessary condition for natural monopoly. In the
multiproduct setting economies of joint production, referred to as economies
of scope, often result in cost subadditive conditions. This is particularly true
when the "products" under consideration are power and, reliability.
In addition, a vertically integrated electric utility can internalize potential
externalities such as "loop flow," a serious problem as the utility loses control
over greater and greater proportions of the power flowing through its transmis-
sion grid. Vertical integration also reduces transactions costs. The increase in
transactions costs caused by vertical de-integration will be passed on to the rate-
paying public. Those advocating deintegration and deregulation have underesti-
mated the associated increase in transactions costs.
60. Western Systems Power Pool, 55 FERC 9 61,099 (1991).
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The EWG environment is unlikely to be competitive. Given sunk costs and
long-term contracts, the electricity utility industry cannot be "contestable".
Absent substantial controls, the deintegrated, deregulated electric utility industry
will evolve into a tight oligopoly where society will be the loser, and a few
lucky investors will be the winners.
It is unfortunate that Congress and FERC have devoted so much effort and
resources to radically reform the utilities industry. There are many less radical
alternatives to regulating the utilities industry that are less costly and more
effective. For example, incentive regulation, DSM, decoupling, competitive
bidding in a controlled environment and other processes yield greater efficiency
without the attendant cost of radical departures.
In an era when we are already beginning to question the wisdom of elimi-
nating airline regulation, with the recent reregulation of cable television, when
take or pay contracts have undermined a great deal of the good created by the
common carrier status for gas pipelines, do we really want to impose the free
market on our electric utilities?
With respect to the move toward more competition in the natural gas
industry, some analysts have observed, "Experimenting with competitive entry,
while maintaining rate regulation or common carrier obligations, can yield
market outcomes that are less efficient than those found under full regulation.
...Entry can provide many benefits, but it can also result in... adverse
welfare effects."'"
61. Paul MacAvoy et al., Is Competitive Entry Free? The Case of By-pass in Natural Gas Markets,
6 YALE J. ON REo. 209, 247 (1989).

